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This paper describes the main concepts from biological game theory and some
modifications that have been suggested to make them more appGcable in economic
contexts. Several examples are given to illustrate that these concepts allow the
formalization of intuitive insights that could not be formalised by traditional, ra-
tionalistic, game theory. In particulaz, the evolution of language, the evolution of
cooperation and convergence towards risk-dominant equilibria aze discussed.
'Paper pn~aentrd at thr Furopean F;conomic Aasociation Meeting in Ffelsinki, Auguat 27-29, 1993.
t1'he author thanks Werner Guth, Sjaak Nurkena, Larry Samuelson and Jéirgen Weibull for helpful
comments and diacussions.1
1 Intro~3uction
Kreps (1990) azgues that non-cooperative game theory has been of value to economists
because it has given them a language for modelling strategic interaction and because it
has enabled the transíer of intuitive insights from simple contexts to more complicated
ones. Most insights have been obtained by using the concept of Nash equilibrium and the
increased popularity of game theoretic ideas has led to an increased awareness of the fact
that the answer to the question "When and why is equilibrium analysis appropriate?"
is not a straightforward one. Unfortunately, game theory has not yet offered useful
alternatives to Nash equilibrium and until recently there has been little progress on the
front of equilibrium selection, i.e. what to do when there are multiple equilibria. (Kreps
( I990). )
Nash (1950) already provided two interpretations of his concept. The first, the "mass-
action~ interpretation, assumes that there is a population of agents for each player role
in the game. Participants accumulate empirical information on the attractiveness of the
various pure strategies and, if play settles down, it must be at a Nash equilibrium. (See
Wcibull (1993) for a uice yuotatiou frorn Nash's thesis.) Shaplcy (19(i1) however, showed
that play need not settle down, there may be a limit cycle. The second interpretation
views equilibrium as a"self-enforcing agreement" (or rational prediction). If a prediction
on the basis of rationality is unique, then in order for it to actually materialize, if it is
known, it has to be a Nash equilibrium. (See Aumann and Brandenburger (1991) for
how much knowledge is needed.) Nash (1950, p. 23) already remarks that this is "quite
strongly a rationalistic and idealising interpretation", and that for it to be valid, it is also
essential to resolve the equilibrium selection problem. Hence, its relevance for economics
may be questioned.
A third justification for Nash equilibrium has its origins in biology and has been
obtaincd first in Maynard Smith and Price (1973). In this interpretation there is no
conscious choice at all: Individuals are programmed to play certain strategies, more
successful strategies reproduce faster than others so that eventually only the most suc-
cessful strategies survive: If the population reaches a stable state, all strategies mustdo equally well, hence the state musL be a Nash equilibrium. An advantage of this bi-
ological approach is that it not only specifies the stable outcomes, but that it gives an
explicit process by means of which these outcomes could possibly be reached. Of course,
economists are well aware of the pitfalls involved in importing ideas from biology into
their own field ( Penrose ( 1952), Hirschleifer (1977)) and it certainly is not clear to what
extent the biological "replicator equations" are relevant in economics. At the same time
these ideas are so attractive - they allow to formalize intuitive insights that traditional
analysis could not for~nalize - that it is difficult to resist them. In this paper we de-
scribe these basic ideas, indicate some modifications that have been suggested to make
them more applicable in economic contexts, and illustrate some of the insights that they
pruvid~~.
2 Basic Concepts from Biological Game Theory
Consider a large (infinite) population, each member of which is programmed to play
a certain strategy s from a set S. Each period individuals from the population are
randomly matched in pairs and if an s-individual meets a t-individual, the payoff (number
of offspring) to s is u(s, t), where u : S x S--~ Rt is a given fitness function. A
monomorphic population in which all individuals play s' is stable, i.e. resistant against
inutations, if each mutant s that enters in the population with small frequency is selected
against. Hence, s' is stable if in the perturbed population in which a small fraction e
pln.yn s, t.h~~ individuri.ln playiu}~ .~' hri.vr inore oRnpring, i.~~.
(1 - e)u(s', s') -~ eu(s', s) ~(1 - e)u(s, s') t eu(s, s) (all s~ s', small E) (2.1)
Note that (2.1) assumes uniform random mixing, i.e. the probability of ineeting some
type does not depend on your own type, there is no viscosity: If mutants would mainly
interact with themselves, they might enter more easily (Hamilton (1964), Myerson, Pol-
lock and Swinkels (1991)). Also stability is tested only against single mutants, mutants3
are assumed to appear infrequently so that each one is driven out before another appears.
Obviously (2.1 ~ is equivalent to the following pair of conditions
u(s,s') G u(s',s') (all s) (2.2)
if u(s, s') - u(s', s'), then u(s', s) 1 u(s, s) (all s~ s') (2.3)
a.n~l ."' is said tu b(' a.n cnnlufiouarfl~ slaólc stralr~y (ESS) if thesc conditions hold.
(Mayuard Smith and Price (1973), Maynard Smith (1982)). Condition (2.2) shows that
(s',s') is a Nash equilibrium if s' is an ESS and because of (2.3) not every symmetric
Nash equilibrium corresponds to an ESS. In fact, every ESS induces a proper (hence,
perfect) equilibrium (Van Damme (1987, Thm 9.3.4)).
Next assume the population is polymorphic and let n,(t) be the number of s-
individuals at time t. Then, one period later, the number of s-individuals is given
by n;(t ~ 1) - n;(t)(1 f~,p,u(s,s)) where p, - p,(t) denotes the fraction of s-types
in the population, i.e. the probability of ineeting such a type. Assuming that the time
between periods is small, we can rewrite the law of motion as n, - n,tL(s, p) where
"(~",1') -~,..1'A('(.",.v) d(~noL(w LI11' f'Xt11Y'L1'(I (Itlll'tlN of .v-typon iu thc~ popu~ation charAC'-
terized by p. V4Jriting n-~, n, and differentiating the identity p,n - n„ we obtain the
following dynamic for the population proportions
ps - pa(~i(s, P) - uÍl', p)) (all .v)
where u(p, p) -~, p,u(s, p) denotes the average fitness of the population. Equation
(2.4) is called the rep[icator equation. It expresses the idea that strategies grow in the
population ií they do better than average, strategies that do best grow fastest. One
itntncdiatc'ly sms that, a Nash equilibrium is a stationary point, of the dynamical system.
Conversely, each stable stationary point is a Nash equilibrium and an asymptotically
stable fixe.d point is a perfect equilibrium (Bomze (1986)). In fact, if we allow for mixed4
strategies to be inherited (as we implicitly assumed above) then asymptotically stable
fixed points of the replicator dynamics correspond exactly to ESS (Bomze and Van
Damme (1992), Hines (1980), Zeeman (1981)). (If only pure strategies can be inherited,
being an ESS is sufficient, but not necessary for asymptotic stability (Taylor and Jonker
(1978)).
Let us conclude this section with an example. In the stag hunt game g(v) of Fig. 1
both C and D aze ESS. The replicator dynamic for this special case is i - x(1 -x)((3-
v)x - 1) where x- p~ is the fraction C in the population. flence, the basis of attraction
of C is x~(3 -- v)-1. lf the initial fraction of cooperators is less than c(v) -(3 - v)-l,
the population moves to "all D".
C D
C 2 2 0 v
D v 0
Fágure 1: Stag Hunt Game g(v). (0 C v C 2)
3 Issues and Problems in an Economic Context
As we saw biological game theory has attractive things to offer: A refinement of Nash
eyuilibrium that is based on minimal rationality requirements and an explicit dynamic
justifying this static equilibrium notion. Especially in those areas of traditional game
theory where the current state of affairs is unsatisfactory, one would like to borrow and
profit from the ideas and concepts of the biological branch of game theory. Specifically,
one may think of the following issues:
I. Evolution of rationality. Uoes evolution wilie out irrational behavior, i.e. are
individuals that play dominated strategies eliminated from the population? Can
the process of iterative elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies be justified
by appealing to evolutionary processes?5
2. Evolution towards equilibrium. In an economic context, can the use of Nash
equilibriurn be justified by appealing to an evolutionary process? Iience, does
evolution force coordination oí individuals' (rational) actiona? In extensive form
games, does evolution lead to more refined notions such as subgame perfect equi-
libria?
3. Evolution of norme. 1)ocw evohition Iead players to a specific Lype of equilibriurn,
i.e. does evolution resolve the problem of equilibrium selection? In particular,
what can we say about the evolution of language? What about the evolution of
cooperation in repeated games? In static games, do evolutionary pressures lead to
eí6cient equilibria?
Of the papers in this session, Weibull's concentrates on the first issue, the Bin-
more~Samuelson paper focuses on the second, while this paper will attempt to illustrate
some aspects related to the third issue. Of course, it is not clear whether the concepts
from Section 2 can be imported into the economic domain without substantial modi-
fication. The replicator dynamics (2.4) may be inadequate to model social interaction
in which individuals possess some consciousness and try to use available information
to their advantage. Obviously, utility is different from fitness and cultural evolution
(through learning, imitation and experimentation) may be governed by a different law of
motion (Boyd and Richerson (1985)), Selten (1991)). Furthermore, also the assumption
of uniform random matching that underlies (2.4) may be appropriate only in a limited
uiunber ol cconomic contexty. Ilonce, a considerahle aniount of Lechnical developmeuL
may be needed before one can sensibly claim that these ideas and concepts are relevant
for applications in economics. Some work has started in this direction.
An important limitation of the basic model is that it only deals with 2-person, sym-
metric, static interact,ions. When players take different roles (such as buyers and sellers),
we havo a.n asymmel.ric conLc,xt. with differenL populations. Selten (1980) showed that,
in the asymmetric case, the conditions analogous to (2.2), (2.3) can be satisfied only at
a strict Nash equilibrium. (If there would be an alternative best reply to the equilib-
rium, a mutant playing this best reply could invade since it would never meet itself.)
Many games do not admit such equilibria, hence, they fail to have ESS. Nonexistence6
is even more prevalent in extensive form games: An F.SS has to reach all information
sets in order to exclude alternative best responses (Selten (1983)). Theoriats have been
reluctant to give up the idea of equilibrium and they have come up with concepts with
somewhat better existence properties. Maynard Smith already introduced the notion of
a raeutmlly stable shntegy, which is defined by replacing the strict inequality in (2.3) by
a weak one. Also set-valued concepts have been introduced. S' is an ESS set if it is
a minimal set such that (2.1) is satisfied for all s' E S' and all s~ S', hence, it is a
minimal noninvadable set. (Cf. Thomas (1985) for a related concept.)
It has also been argued that (2.3) might be too stringent a requirement in economic
coutexts. '}'his condition requires stability against all mutants, including "stupid" ones,
auel one uiight arguc, Lhat, whi~n mutants arise biY~ause of conscious experimentation,
such stupid one~s will not be introducPd in the popnlation and, hence, pose no threat.
We might be satisfied, therefore, if stability against "sensible" mutants is gua.ranteed.
The following example (Swinkels (1992)) may make this more clear. In Fig. I, let
v- 3 so that the game becomes prisoners' dilemma. Suppose individuals have the
choice between taking up an outside option O and playing the game and that, if at least
one individual takes up O, each individual has payoff 3~2. All Nash equilibria result in
(O, O) but thexe is no ESS: A population of "all O" can be invaded by a C-mutant. The
mutant does equally well against O as O does and it does strictly better when it meets
itself. However, a U-mutant can prey on the C-mutant and it might be that, if agents
have consciousness, D's are introduced as soon as C's are around. In this case, C's
are eliminated immediately and they pose no threat. Swinkels (1992) defines "sensible"
mutants as mutants that are best responses to the "perturbed" population in which they
are present in small numbers and an equilibrium evolutionarily stable strategy, EES, is a
strategy Lhat is atahle against such mutants. He also definc~s the set valued analogue of
this concept.7
4 Two Applications Using the Static Approach
It is an intuitive idea that communication and~or repetition helps players to coordinate
on efficient eyuilibria. Although (D, D) might make perfectly good sense in the gameg(v)
of Fig. 1 if players cannot communicate, it would seem that players would talk themselves
into the efficient equilibrium (C,C) if they could talk. (However, see Aumann (1992).)
Similarly, there is the intuition that repeated play not only allows players to cooperate
but that it even forces players to do so (Axelrod (1984), Axelrod and Hamilton (1981)). It
has, however, proved hard to formalize these intuitions and the formal literature dealing
with these topics has been somewhat disappointing. For "repeated games", the "folk
theorem" tells us that basically anything can happen: Repetition allows more efficient
outcomes to be reached, but also less efficient ones. Communication games are plagued
by "babbling equilibria": If everybody else talks nonsense and refuses to listen, each
player can do no better than talk nonsense and refuse to listen, hence, play will be as if
there was no communication. In this section we indicate how the evolutionary approach
can yield results that are more in line with our intuition.
4.1 The ]Evolution of Language
Consider the coordination game from Fig. 1 and extend this game by allowing players to
exchange messages (from some set M) before the play of the game. A strategy s-(rn, f)
now consists ofa message m together with a rule f(.) telling which action f(m') to choose
in response t.o the opponent's rnessagc nz'. Llsing a message is assumed to be costless.
(llurkens (1993) cousiders the case of costly messages. Ile derives an efficiency result for
curb equilibria (Basu and Weibull (1991)) and for persistent equilibria (Kalai and Samet
(1984)). 1'he evolutionary foundations of these concepts still have to be investigated.)
Obviously, if M contains at least two messages, no pure strategy s' can be an ESS
or an EES: There can be drift at each unused message. Kim and Sobel (1991) work
with EES sets and establish existence and efficiency for EES sets. For more general
games there appears to be a trade-off between efficiency and existence - one might lose
one or the other - so more work is needed. I now sketch the essential part of theh
Kim~Sobel construction. I restrict myself to pure strategies - to obtain the result for
mixed strategies, two populations are needed, see Kim~SobeL (For related results, see
Bhaskar (1992), Fudenberg and Maskin ( 1991), Matsui ( 1991) and Warneryd (1991).
Consider a population that plays the inefficient strategy D in the communication
game. We may assume that there has been drift such that there is at least one unused
message na'. A mutant may now use this message to signal its intention to switch to
the more efficient strategy C. Hence, the mutant plays s' -(m', f) where f(m') - C
and f(m) - D for each message m that is used by the original population. Whether
the mutant is successful or not depends on how the original population reacts to the
"unconventional" signal vn': If rn' is treated as if it were an equilibrium message, then s'
docs better than rnembers of the original population; if the use of n:' is punished, then
the rnutant does worse and dies out. Since, in the original population, the response at
m' can drift freely as long as there are no mutants around, it is possible that the mutant
enters exactly when the original population has drifted to not punishing m', hence, it is
iudeed possible for the mutant to take over. (Actually, if we would enlarge the model
by takiug the- couipla~xity of strategies into account more complex strategies being
costlier than simpler oncs - then the original population would necessarily move to not
punishing m' and the mutant s' would take over more easily (Wárneryd ( 1993)). Hence,
the inefficient equilibrium is not stable and only the efficient equilibrium can be stable.
Kim and Sobel (1991) show that there indeed is an EES set with outcome (C, C).
4.2 The Evolution of Cooperation
In Fig. 1, let 2 C v G 4, so that the game is a prisoners' dilemma. Let this game
be repeated infinitely often with players evaluating streams of payoffs according to the
limit of the means. Aumann ( 1981) considered the case where players are restricted
to simple reactive strategies. Such a strategy specifies an action with which to start
as well as a rule f(-) of how to continue after each actíon of the opponent in the past
period. As there are 8 such strategies, we obtain an 8 x 8 matrix which can, by repeated
elimination of weakly dominated strategies be reduced to the strategy (C; CD), i.e. start
by cooperating and in each later period do what the other did in the previous period.9
Hence, only TIT-FOR-TAT survives. See Weibull (1993) for the extent to which such
iterative elimination corresponds to an evolutionary process- Note that the 8 x 8 game
does not have aa ESS but that TIT-FOR-TAT is neutrally stable.
Binmore and Samuelson (1993) investigate the consequences of allowing more general
strategies that can be represented as finite automata. Following Abreu and Rubinstein
(1988), they assume that complexity costs enter payoffs in lexicographic fashion. Now a
population consisting of TIT-FOR-TAT players is no longer stable: The strategy "always
cooperate" does strictly better since it has lower complexity. But, of course, this strategy
can be invaded as well. Nevertheless, Binmore and Samuelson show that a population
can he stable only if all its members cooperate.
Fudenberg and Maskin (1990) also work with strategies of finite complexity but they
do not take complexity costs into account. They, however, assume that mistakes might be
made in executing the strategy, i.e. if the intended action is a, something might go wrong
and the actual action might be á ~E a. Such mistakes allow cooperative strategies to
invade a population playing the game inefficiently. The essential idea is similar to the one
discussed in the previous subsection. Consider a monomorphic population programmed
as a ftnite automaton. The population goes through finitely many different states and
all of thesc, st.ates are reached with posit,ive probability because of the mistakes. In the
state with the lowest average payoff, deviating mutants cannot be punished. Hence, if
the payoff in thís state would not be efficient, the mutant could gain by identifying itself
in Lhis state and by switching to cooperation if it mmts itselL Hence, only cooperation
is ueutrally stable~. (Maskin (1993) ahows how to extcnd the argument to discounted
gamcs. In Lhis case some viscosity (i.e. clustering of mutants) is needed in order to force
cooperation. )
5 Examples with Noisy Evolutionary Dynamics
'I'he reader is referred to Weibull (1993) for results concerning the deterministic replicator
dynamics (2.4). Any strict Nash equilibrium is an asymptotically stable stationary point
of this dynamic, hence, the evolutionary process does not help in selecting among such10
equilibria. Fo~ter and Young (1990) and Fudenberg and Harris (1992) show that a
particular selection may be obtained by adding stochastic noise to the system. We
illustrate the basic ideas by considering the mathematically more tractable case of a
fiuite population in discrete time. The model is inspired by Kandori, Mailath and Rob
(1993). (Also s~ Young (1993a, b) who appliea the same techniques to analyze a noisy
version of the Brown~Robinson process.)
Assume thc stag hunt garne from Fig. 1 is played by a large but finite population
of size N, an even number. In each period t- 1, 2, ..., the rnembers of the population
are randomly matched in pairs to play. The state of the system at t is characterized by
how many members, cr, cooperate at that time. Assume that at each point in time with
positive probability at least one member observes the current state of the system, that
each iudividual who observes the state at t chooses, at time tt 1, a best response to cr and
that players who do not receive new information do not switch actions. The evolution
of the system is now described by a Markov chain. We have that, if cr G(N - 2~(3 - v)
(resp. ct ~(N ~ 1)~(3 - v)) a person who is informed at t chooses to play D (resp.
C) at time t f 1. Hence, the system ha,s two stable stationary states corresponding to
the two strict equilibria of the game. For large populations, we have that, if the initial
fraction of cooperators is more than c(v) -(3 - v)-r, we converge to "all C", otherwise
we converge to "all D". The result is in line with the one obtained by (2.4).
Now add naise to the system. Suppose players make mistakes in executing their
strategies. When a player intends to play a, he actually plays a' with small, but positive
probability e, with mistake probabilities of different players being independent. The
Markov chain is now ergodic, all states have a strictly positive probability of being
obs~~rvc,d in th~~ liuiit ,i,v tiin~~ tr,nils to iulinity. Wh~~n t is vc~ry amall, howow,r, it is ruuch
more likely to observe the system in the states "all C" or "all Dr than in any other state.
(I am assuming that e is of smaller order than the probability that at least one player
observes the state of the system.) Because of the mistakes ("mutations~) the system can
move from "all C" to "all D" and vice versa. To move away from "all C" we need the
simultaneous mutation (to D) of a fraction of at least 1- c(v) of the population, while
to move away from "all Dn, the simultaneous mutation of a fraction c(v) is needed. If11
1- c(v) G c(v~, then the second possibility is less likely by an order of magnitude than
the, first, hence, in this case an outside observer will mostly see the system in "all D".
[f c(v) G 1~2, then, on the other hand, we will mostly see "all C". Hence, if we take the
limit for E to zero, we see that the system will be in "all C" if v G 1 and in "all D" if
v~ 1. In the long run, the system is observed to be in the risk-dominant equilibrium
(Harsanyi and Selten (1988)).
Of course, it might take very long to reach the long-run equilibrium. Ellison (1992)
notes that convergence depends on the structure of social interaction. Assume that the
N individiials live along the shores of a lake and that each individual is matched either
with his left or with his right neighbor. If v~ 1, then a person who has at least one
neighbor playing D finds it optimal to play D as well, hence, to move from "all C" to
"all D" only one mutation is nE.rded. Once there is one D, the regular dynamics takes
the system to "all D~. Hence, the system will move quickly from "all C„ to "all D„.
It can leave from there only if two next neighbors mutate at the same time and this is
unlikely. Ilence, "all D" is stable and this state is reached quickly.
The above stories justify equilibrium selection according to the risk-dominance crite-
rion. It is easy to modify the dynamics so as to obtain selection of the Pareto-efficient
equilibrium (Vega-Redondo (1993)). Return to the case with uniform random matching
but assume the following information structure and adjustment process. With positive
probability a person sees the outcome of a match in which he did not take part. If players
in this match coordinate on the same action and if this action yields a higher payoff than
what the person himself gets, he switches to it, otherwise he stays put. With execution
crrors ("mutants") as above, we only need two mutants in order for the dynamics to
take us away from "all D". As at least three mutants are needed to upset "all C", the
long-run equilibrium is "all C".
Another modification of the process yields the outcome "all D~ as long as v) 0.
Assume a player observes only the payoffs in his own match and that he mimics the
action of his partner if this partner is more success(ul. Then any C-type that is matched
with a D-type switches to D, so that only one mutant is needed to upset "all C" and,
hence, the long-run equilibrium is "all D".12
6 Conclusion
The previous section óas shown that the results - the equilibria - depend on the evo-
lutionary dynarnics. Our mot.ive for inclnding thrwe examples was to illustrate just this
phenomenon, vvhich forces us to discuss (and study) which processes make sense in which
settings. In my opinion, evolutionary game theory should not be judged by the results
it has yielded thus far but by the promise it holds for the future. 1t enables a shift in
emphasis, a move from static equilibrium to dynamic processes, a step towards a richer
theory. What is striking about the work done to date in this area is especially the crude
modclliug uf hormdedly rationaJ bclravior a.ud of iuuovatious ("mutants") and the cou-
stantness of the underlying game through time. For a richer modelling of behavior rules
and innovations, the classifier systems of Holland (1992) offer an attractive alternative
and I refer to Marimon et al. (1990) for an application of these to the evolution oí money.
It is less clear how to deal with the second issue. Recalling that the success of man lies
mainly in its ability to alter his environment, i.e. to change the rules of the game, makes
it clear that a study of the evolution of the rules of the game is no less of a pressing, and
challenging issue.
References
Abreu, D. and A. Rubinstein (1988). "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated
Games with Finite Automata", Econometrica 56, 1259-1282.
Aumann, R.J. (1990). "Nash Equilibria are not Self-Enforcing", in Economic Decision-
Mnkiny: (lratu.y, lironomrlric.~ nrtrl (Jplirni.vrtlion r~ds. J.,l. (iabsLl~wicz, J.-F.
Richard and L.A. Wolsey, Elsevier Science Publishers, 201-206.
Aumann, R.J. (1981). "Survey of Repeated Gamesr, in Essays in Came Theory and
Mathematica! Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Bibliographisches Insti-
tut Mannheim~Wien~Ziirich, 11-42.
Aumann, R.J. and A. Brandenburger (1991). "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilib-
rium", Mimeo Hebrew University.13
Axelrod, R(1~J84). The Evolution ojCooperation. Basic Books, New York.
Axeh~od, It. aud W.1). Ilamilton (1981). "The F,volution of Cooperation", Science 211,
1390-1:396.
Basu, K. and J. Weibull (1991). "Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behaviorr,
Economic's Getters 38. 141-146.
Bhaskar, V. (1992). "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation", Mimeo.
Binmore, K. a.~d L.Samuelson (1993). "Drift", Mimeo Wisconsin University.
Bomze,LM. (198f). "Non-Cooperative 2-person Cames in Biology: A Classification",
InteT-national Journal oj Game Theory 15, 31-59.
Bomze, LM. and E. Van Damme (1992). "A Dynamical Characterization of Evolution-
ary SLablc~ Sl.a.t~w", Anual.. nj C)petrttian Rrsrurrh 27, 229-244.
Boyd, R. and P. Richerson (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago.
I;Ilison, G. (199:3). "Learning, hocal Interaction, and Coordination", F,conometr~ica 81,
1047-1072.
Foster, D. and P. Young (1990). "Stochastic Evolutionary Game DynamicsH, Theoret-
ica! Population Biology 38, 219-232.
Fudenberg, D. and C. Harris (1992). "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks",
Journal of Economic Theory 57, 420-441.
Fudenberg, D. and E. Maskin (1990). "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated
Games", American Economic Review 80, 274-279.
Fudenberg, D. a.nd E. Maskin (1991). "Evolution and Communication in Games",
Notcs.
Hamilton, W.D. (1964). "The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior", Journal of
Theoreticnl Biology 7, 1-52.14
Harsanyi, J.C, and R. Selten (1988). A Ceneml Theory oJ Equilibrium Selection in
Games. 1"91T Press, Cambridge MA.
Hines, W.G.S. (1980). "Three Characterizations of Population Strategy Stability",
Jaur~url m,f Applird Pmbabilily 17, 333-340.
liirschleifcr, J. (1977). "Economic from a Biological Viewpoint", Journal oj Gaw and
F,conornics 20, 1-52.
Ilollaud, .l.ll. (l99'l). Adrq,latinn in Natuml and Arfificia! Systems. MI'I' I'ress, Carn-
bridge MA (second edition).
Hurkens, S. (1993). "Multi-Sided Pre-Play Communication by Burning Money", Cen-
tF,R DP 9319.
Kalai, E. and D. Samet (1984). "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games", Interna-
tional Journat oJ Game Theory 13, 129-144.
Kandori, M., G.J. Mailath and R. Rob (1993). "Learning, Mutation and Long Run
Equilibria in Gamesr, Econometrica 61, 29-56.
Kreps, D. (1990). Game Theory and Economic Modeling. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Kim, Y.-G. and J. Sobel (1991). "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communica-
tionn, Misneo University of California at San Diego.
Marimon, R., E. McGratten and T. Sargent ( 1990). "Money as a Medium of Exchange
in an Ecanomy with Artificial Intelligent Agents", Journal oJ Economic Dynamics
Contral bf 14, 3`L9-373.
Maskin, E. (1993). "Evolution and Repeated Games", Notes.
Matsui, A. (1991). "Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Societyr, Journa! of Economic
Theory 54, 245-258.1.5
Maynard Smiyh, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Gamea Cambridge University
Press.
Maynard Smith, J. and G.R. Price (1973). "The Logic of Animal Conflict", Nature,
l,ond. 248, 15-18.
Myerson, R.B., G.B. Pollock and J.M. Swinkels (1991). "Viacous Population Equilib-
ria", (larr:rx anrl lirnnnmic Rrhnvinr3, 101-109.
Nash, J.F. (15i50). Non-Cooperative Cames. PhD Dissertation, Princeton University.
Penrose, E.T. (1952). "Biological Analogies in the Theory of the Firmn, American
Economie Revietu 42, 804-819.
Selten, R.. (1980). "A Note on Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Asymrnetric Animal
Conllicts", Jnuraal of 7'heoi~elical Biology 84, 93-101.
Selten, R. (1983). "Evolutionary Stability in Extensive 2-person Games", Mathematical
Social Sciences 5, 269-363.
Selten, R. (1991). "Evolution, Learning and Economic Behaviorn, Cames and Economic
Behavior 3, 3-24.
Shapley, L.S. (1964). "Some Topics in Two-Person Games", in Advances in Game
Theory, eds. M. Dresher, L.S. Shapley and A.W. Tucker. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, N.J.
Swinkels, J.M. (1992). "Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrantsr, Journal of
Economi-c Theory 57, 306-332.
'faylor, P.D. and I,.B..lonker (1978). "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dy-
namics", Mathematical Bioscience 40, 145-1.56.
Thomas, B. (1985). "On Evolutionarily Stable Sets", Journal of Mathematical Biology
22, 105-115.16
Van Dammo, E. (1987). Stability and Perfection of Nnsh Equilibria. Springer Verlag,
Berlin. S.cond edition 1987.
Vega-Redondo, F. (1993). "On the Evolution of Cooperation in General Games of
Common..Interest", Mimeo University of Allicante.
Wàrneryd, K-M. (1992). "Evolutionary Stability in Unanimity Games with Cheap
Talk", E~.onomécs Letters 39, 295-300.
Wàrneryd, K M. (1993). "Communication, Complexity, and Evolutionary Stability",
CentER í7P 9313.
Weibull, J. (1993). "The `As [f' Approach to Game Theory: 3 Positive Results and 4
Obstacles", Mimeo Stockholm University.
Young, P. ( 1993a). "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining", Journal of Economic
Theory 59, 145-168.
Young, P. (199ab). "'I'he~ Evulut.ion o( Conventions", Econametrica 81, 57-84.
'Leeman, E.C. (1981). "Dynamics of the Evolution of Animal Conflict", Journal of
Theorelical Biology 89, 249-270.Discussioo Papcr Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
(For previous pa,pers please consult previous discussion papers.)
No. Author(s) Title
9239 H. Blcemen
9240 F. Drost and
Th. Nijmsn
9241 R. Gilles. P. Ruys
and J. Shou
9242 P. Kort
9243 A.L. Bovenberg and
F. van der Plceg
9244 W.G. Gale and
J.K. Scholz










9251 S. Eijffinger and
E. Schaling




9301 N. Kahana and
S. Nitzan
A Model of Labour Supply with Job Offer Restrictions
Temporal Aggregation of GARCH Processes
Coalition Fortnation in Large Network Economies
The Effects of Marketable Pollution Permits on the Finn's
Optimal Investment Policies
Environmental Policy, Public Finance and the Labour Market
in a Second-Best World
IRAs and Household Saving
Robust Tests for Heteroskedasticity and Autocorretation Using
Score Function
The Long Memory and Variability of Inflation: A
Reappraisal of the Friedman Hypothesis
A Generalized Method of Moments Estimator for Long-
Memory Processes
Partisanship as Infortnation
The Welfare Effects of Individual Retirement Accounts
Job Search Theory, Labour Supply and Unemployment Duration
Central Bank Independence: Searching for the Philosophers'
Stone
Environmental Taxation and Labor-Market Distortions
Pertnanent Income, Current Income and Consumption: Evidence
from Panel Data
[mperfect Credibility of the Band and Risk Premia in the
European Monetary System
Credibility and Duration of Political Contests and the Extent
of Rent DissipationNo. Author(s;1
9302 W. GOth and
S. Nit~an




9306 B. Pclcg and
S. Tijs
9307 G. Imbens and
A. Lancaster
9308 T. Ellingsen and
K. Warneryd
9309 H. Bester
9310 T. Callan and
A. van Soest
9311 M. Pradhan and
A. van Scest





9315 F. C. Drost and





9318 M.J.G. van Eijs
9319 S. Hurkens
9320 1.J.G. Lemmen and
S.C.W. Eijffinger
9321 A.L. Bovenberg and
S. Smulders
Title
Are Moral Objections to Free Riding Evolutionarily Stable?
Some Peculiarities of Group Decision Making in Teams
Euler Equations in Micro Data: Merging Data from Two Samples
A Simple Justification ofQuantity Competition and the Cournot-
Oligopoly Solution
The Consistency Principle For Games in Stretegic Form
Case Control Studies with Contaminated Controls
Foreign Direct Investment and the Political Economy of
Protection
Price Commitment in Search Markets
Female Labour Supply in Farm Households: Farm and
Off-Farm Participation
Formal and Infonnal Sector Employment in Urban Areas of
Bolivia
Marginalization and Contemporaneous Aggregation in
Multivariate GARCH Processes
Communication, Complexity, and Evolutionary Stability
Consumption over the Life Cycle and over the Business
Cycle
A Note on Robinson's Test of Independence
On Games Corresponding to Sequencing Situations
with Ready Times
On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments - A Personal Review
On the Determination ofthe Control Parameters of the Optimal
Can-order Policy
Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Buming Money
The Quantity Approach to Financial Integration: The
Feldstein-Horioka Criterion Revisited
Environmental Quality and Pollution-saving Technological















9332 V. Feltkamp, A. Koster,
A. van den Nouweland,
P. Bortn and S. Tijs
9333 B. Lauterbach and
U. Ben-Zion
9334 B. Melenberg and
A. van Scest
9335 A.L. Bovenberg and




9339 W. Giith and H. Kliemt
9340 T.C. To
9341 A. DemirgOF-Kunt and
H. Huizinga
Title
The Will to Save Money: an Essay on Economic Psychology
The (2"'m" - 2}Ray Algorithm: A New Variable Dimension
Simplicial Algorithm For Computing Economic Equilibria on
S" x Rm
The Financing and Taxation of U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad
Central Bank Independence: Theory and Evidence
Infant Industry Protection with Leaming-by-Doing
Bankruptcy Litigation and Optimal Debt Contracts
Tariffs, Rent Extraction and Manipulation of Competition
A Comparison of the Cost of Trading French Shares on the
Paris Bourse and on SEAQ International
The Welfare Effects of Individual Retirement Accounts
Time Preference and International Tax Competition
Linear Production with Transport of Products, Resources and
Technology
Panic Behavior and the Performance of Circuit Breakers:
Empirical Evídence
Semi-parametric Estimation of the Sample Selection Model
Green Policies and Public Finance in a Small Open Economy
On the Economic Independence of the Central Bank and the
Persistence of Inflation
Characterizations of a Game Theoretical Cost Allocation
Method
Provision of Public Goods With lncomplete Information:
Decentraliz~tion vs. Central Planning
Competition or Co-operation
Export Subsidies and Oligopoly with Switching Costs
Barriers to Portfolio Investments in Emerging Stock MarketsNo. Author(sn
9342 G.J. Alm..kinders
9343 E.R.van Dam and
W.H. Haemers
9344 H. Carlsson and
S. Dasgupta
9345 F. van der Ploeg and
A.L. Bovenberg
9346 1.P.C. Blanc and
R.D. van der Mei
9347 J.P.C. Blranc
9348 R.M.W.J. Beetsmaand
F. van der Ploeg
9349 A. Simonovi[s
9350 R.C. Douven and
J.C. Engwerda
9351 F. Vella and
M. Verbeek
9352 C. Meghi2 and
G. Weber
9353 V. Feltkamp
9354 R.J. de Gcoof and
M.A. van Tuijl
9355 Z. Yang
9356 E. van D~rrtme and
S. Hurkens
9357 W. Giith and B. Peleg
9358 V. Bhaskar
9359 F. Vella and M. Verbeek
9360 W.B. van den Hout and
J.P.C. Blanc
Title
Theories on the Scope for Foreign Exchange Market Intervention
Eigenvalues and the Diameter of Graphs
Noise-Proof Equilibria in Signaling Games
Environmental Policy, Public Goods and the Marginal Cost
of Public Funds
The Power-series Algorithm Applied to Polling Systems with
a Dormant Server
Performance Analysis and Optimi7ation with the Power-
series Algorithm
Intramarginal Interventions, Bands and the Pattem of EMS
Exchange Rate Distributions
Intercohort Heterogeneity and Optimal Social Insurance Systems
Is There Room for Convergence in the E.C.?
Estimating and Interpreting Models with Endogenous
Treatment Effects: The Relationship Between Competing
Estimators ofthe Union Impact on Wages
Intertemporal Non-separability or Borrowing Restrictions? A
Disaggregate Analysis Using the US CEX Panel
Altemative Axiomatic Characterizations of the Shapley and
Banzhaf Values
Aspects of Goods Market Integration. A Two-Country-Two
-Sector Analysis
A Simplicial Algorithm for Computing Robust Stationary Points
of a Continuous Function on the Unit Simplex
Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing
On Ring Formation In Auctions
Neutral Stability In Asymmetric Evolutionary Games
Estimating and Testing Simultaneous Equation Panel Data
Models with Censored Endogenous Variables
The Power-Series Algorithm Extended to the BMAPIPHII QueueNo. Author(s,.





9365 F. van der Ploeg and
A. L. Bo-enberg
9366 M. Pradhan
9367 H.G. Bloemen and
A. Kapteyn
9368 M.R. Baye, D. Kovenock
and C.G. de Vries
9369 T. van de Klundert and
S. Smulders










An (s,q) Inventory Model with Stochastic and lnterrelated Lead
Times
A Closer Look at Economic Psychology
On the Connectedness of the Set of Constrained Equilibria
A Note on "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a
Repeated Game"
Direct Crowding Out, Optimal Taxation and Pollution Abatement
Sector Participation in Labour Supply Models: Preferences or
Rationing?
The Estimation of Utility Consistent Labor Supply Models by
Means of Simulated Scores
The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R~ 2:
Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates
The Welfare Consequencesof Different Regimes ofOligopolistic
Competition in a Growing Economy with Firm-Specific
Knowledge
Intersection Theorems on the Simplotope
Altemating-Move Preplays and vN - M Stable Sets in Two
Person Strategic Form Games
Voters' Power in lndirect Voting Systems with Political Parties:
the Square Root Effect
Pollution Abatement and Long-term Growth
Marginal Equivalence in v-Spherical Models
9375 E. van Damme Evolutionary Game TheoryP.O. BOX 90153, 5000 LE TILBURG, THE NETHERLAND
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabant
IIIIII IIIIII IIIIIIII IIII IIII IIIIII IIIIIIIIII II IIIIIIIII III I II III
~ 7 000 O 1 1 33585 9